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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
because the fee had been devised in a prior section of the will, the
executors possessed a mere naked discretionary power, and as a result,
equitable conversion was not involved.
The instant case does not change any law, for the requirement of a
duty to effect an equitable conversion is very basic to this concept.' 6
In any event, the case is of interest because the power was to last for
five years, and this bill was filed during that period. The court used the
thought expressed in the Vierieg case that filing a bill for partition sus-
pends a discretionary power and granting the bill terminates it, notwith-
standing the fact that in the Vierieg case it was held that the power
lapsed by passage of an unreasonable time.
Apparently there is another facet in the nature of these powers which
the court did not deem necessary to discuss. A testator who creates a
discretionary power to last a specified period of time might have his
intention defeated. This power might be terminated by a devisee obtain-
ing partition before the power lapses. The only limitation on this right
is that the suit may not be filed so soon after the opening of the estate
that the executor has not had a reasonable time to act.1 7 Thus, it appears
that the effect of attaching a period of time onto these powers is not
to make them indefeasible for that period, but merely to effect an auto-
matic cessation of the right that the executor possessed to execute the
power, if that right has not already been terminated before the expira-
tion of the period.
TAXATION-STATE UNABLE TO FORCE NON-
RESIDENT SELLER TO COLLECT USE TAX
Maryland enacted a tax on the use, storage, or consumption of tangible
personal property purchased within the state. The vendor is given the
task of collecting the tax, and for said collection and remittance to the
state of Maryland is compensated on the basis of three per cent of the
gross tax.' Because plaintiff, a Delaware corporation doing business in
Delaware, had not collected and remitted the tax, Maryland attached a
delivery truck of the plaintiff while the truck was in that state making a
routine delivery. In reversing the Maryland Court of Appeals, the United
States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that while the tax
created a liability on the inhabitants of Maryland, the Delaware corpora-
tion could not be made a collector of the tax due to an absence of juris-
diction over the plaintiff. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
16 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 1160 (5th ed., Symons, 1941).
17 Sartain v. Davis, 323 Ill. 269, 154 N.E. 101 (1926); Fischer v. Butz, 224 Il. 379, 79
N.E. 659 (1906).
1 Md. Ann. Code (Flacks, 1951) Art. 81, § 369.
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The use tax is a protective-tariff-type tax in that it protects the state's
sales tax revenue, and it also protects the resident merchants from exces-
sive competition from merchants in foreign states which charge no sales
tax. Because of this protection many states have enacted such a tax,2 and
its constitutionality has consistently been upheld.3 The theory of validity
of the use tax is that it is not a burden on interstate commerce. Rather, it
is an assessment on the property after it has left the channels of commerce
and has come to rest in the state.
The issue in the instant case did not concern the validity of the tax, but
instead involved the right of Maryland to force the nonresident plaintiff
to collect the tax. Before a state may exercise any power over a person,
there must be an establishment of jurisdiction.4 At what point jurisdiction
attaches is the subject of this and other litigation.
In Felt and Tarrant Co. v. Gallagber5 the vendor, an Illinois corpora-
tion, contracted with agents in California to demonstrate merchandise and
solicit orders which were approved and filled in Illinois. The office rent
of the agents was paid by the corporation. It was held that California
could validly make the vendor a collector of its use tax, justification for so
holding being that the corporation maintained a place of business in the
state. The activities of the corporation's agents were relied on by the court
to establish that the corporation was doing "business" within the state.
A more controversial set of facts presented itself in Nelson v. Sears,
Roebuck Co.,6 and Nelson v. Montgomery Ward Co.' both of which
were decided by the same court on the same day. The appellants in those
cases maintained retail department stores in Iowa and collected the Iowa
sales tax on sales made in those stores. The mail order divisions of the two
stores were outside the state of Iowa. Thus, mail orders of Iowa residents
were solicited, accepted, and filled outside the state. Because the sales tax
and use tax are complementary, it was held that the appellants having
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of Iowa for the collection of the
sales tax likewise submitted themselves to the state's jurisdiction for the
purposes of the use tax. The decision is justified on the premise that the
appellants' mail order businesses cannot be separated from their local
2 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Wash-
ington, Wyoming, and the City of New York.
3Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937); Monamotor Oil Co. v.
Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934). The Illinois Cigarette Use Tax Act has been upheld in
Jobnson v. Halpin, 413 Ill. 257,108 N.E. 2d 429 (1952). However, the Motor Vehicle
Use Tax Act has been found to be unconstitutional because of vagueness. People v.
Carpentier, 2 Il. 2d 468, 118 N.E. 2d 319 (1954).
4 E.g., New York, L.E. & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628 (1894).
5 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
6312 U.S. 359 (1941). 7312 U.S. 373 (1941).
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businesses and thus should be included in the benefits of doing business in
the state.
The importance of the reasoning in the last mentioned cases is empha-
sized in J. B. Simpson v. Gundry8 where the vendor maintained a mail
order business from Illinois, and merely shipped the merchandise into
Michigan, title passing on delivery to the carrier. Because the mail order
house had not subjected itself to the jurisdiction of Michigan by main-
taining a retail store there, the state could not force the vendor to collect
the use tax. Jurisdiction of the merchant is the key to these cases, yet the
dissent in the Simpson case seems to ignore it.
Maryland in the instant case relies upon General Trading Co. v. State
Tax Commission of Iowa.9 There, the corporation was found to be doing
business in the state because its salesmen solicited orders in the taxing state
followed by the delivery of the goods to the purchaser. The only non-
local phase of the transaction was the routine acceptance of the orders in
Minnesota. Even though the sales arrangements were not elaborate, juris-
diction over the seller was found to be present.
In attempting to use the General Trading Co. case as an authority in
the instant case, Maryland advanced four activities of the plaintiff on
which jurisdiction in the taxing state might rest: 1) the vendor's adver-
tising with Delaware papers and radio stations, though not especially di-
rected to Maryland inhabitants, reached, and was known to reach, their
notice; 2) its occasional sales circulars mailed to all former customers in-
cluded customers in Maryland; 3) it delivered some purchases to common
carriers consigned to Maryland addresses; 4) it delivered purchases by its
own vehicles to Maryland addresses. The late Mr. Justice Jackson, who
had dissented in the General Trading Co. case, wrote the court's opinion
to the effect that these activities were only incidental effects of general
advertising, and none of these were sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
The four dissenting justices could not see why this case did not come
under the principles announced in the General Trading Co. case. The
fact that all the sales were not made on a cash and carry basis was said to
be the uniting factor between the two cases. When the sales clerks took
addresses for delivery in Maryland, they could have added the use tax at
a slight burden, this burden being compensated by the fee provided by
the statute. Also, it was submitted that jurisdiction was obtained when
the delivery truck ventured into Maryland.
The majority opinion in the instant case seems to be the better reasoned
since the necessity of jurisdiction over an intended taxpayer is a very
fundamental principle of taxation. This case illustrates that the activity
which causes jurisdiction to attach must be more than solicitation through
8297 Mich. 403, 298 N.W. 81 (1941). 9 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
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general advertising or an occasional presence of a delivery truck in the
taxing state. It must be admitted, however, that the activities described,
especially the entrance of the delivery truck into the taxing state, present
a borderline situation. That fact, plus the ratio between the majority and
minority of the court, leads to the observation that perhaps little
more activity in the taxing state was necessary to give Maryland jurisdic-
tion. However, due to the great emphasis on factual situations, future cases
concerning the collection of use taxes from nonresident merchants might
be easily distinguished.
TAXATION-STOCK OPTION GIVEN AS COMPENSATION
HELD INCOME UPON GRANTING
Petitioner entered into a two-year employment contract and was grant-
ed a stock option as part of the contract, to be exercised within the
two-year period. Although the option was exercised in part the first
year, and the remainder the second year, both the petitioner and his
employer treated the option as "compensation" for services rendered the
first year, using the difference between the fair market value of the stock
at the time the option was granted and the option price as the basis for
their income tax return. The Tax Court agreed that the option was in-
tended as additional "compensation" but held that the dates of exercise
determined the income to be reported. On review, the Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court, holding that the option was intended as addi-
tional compensation for services for the year in which the option was
granted and thus it was taxable in that year only. McNamara v. Con-
7m issioner of Internal Revenue, 210 F. 2d 505 (C.A. 7th, 1954).
The petitioner, on August 24, 1945, entered into an employment con-
tract with the National Tea Company for a term of two years begin-
ning March 21, 1945, which, among other things, contained a provision
to the effect that he was to receive a stated salary of $27,500 with addi-
tional annual compensation of two per cent of the net profits over
$300,000. In addition the petitioner was granted the following option
by National on August 24, 1945:
... this certifies that an option is hereby extended to said HARLEY V. MC-
NAMARA, his heirs, . .. and assigns, to expire on August 24, 1947, to pur-
chase 12,500 shares of the common stock of this corporation,... at such times
prior to August 24, 1947, as he or they shall elect, upon the payment to this
corporation of the cash sum of $16.00 for each share so purchased. ...
On the same day the board of directors of National, at a special meet-
ing, adopted the following resolution:
WHEREAS, the Executive Committee of this corporation has recommended
that, in addition to the stated cash payments on account of salary and such
